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Russia’s Connection to European Populist Parties 
The link between Putin’s Russia and European populist parties is emerging as 
a key concern in European foreign policy circles. The affiliation of the European 
far right with the Kremlin is naturally the most pronounced,2 but there is also an 
unmistakable pattern of alignment between radical left positions in Europe and 
trends of foreign policy thought in Moscow.3  For the European far right, Putin’s 
uninterrupted reign since 1999 represents a victorious expression of their own neo-
conservative ideology and the governing potential of the right-wing.4 Conversely, 
the European radical left could be drawn to Russia through historical communist 
links and Putin’s anti-capitalist mannerisms.5  Hence, although European populists 
start from different ideological backgrounds, their perceptions of Russia converge 
when this serves their Eurosceptic agendas.6  Thus, across the populist spectrum, 
Putin’s Russia is seen as a strategic ally for European states and a counterweight to 
the ‘ever closer’ European Union. 
Concern is also growing for the financial links between Russia and the European 
populist parties and/or individual politicians. The Front National (FN) is a case in 
point: Marine Le Pen borrowed nine million euros from First Czech Russian Bank 
(FCRB), and she was in talks with the Kremlin about another loan.7  Reportedly, in 
2016, Le Pen confirmed this transaction and stated that she was going to ask for 
more money from Russia with which she intends to fund her upcoming presidential 
campaign.8  But the FN is only the tip of the iceberg as, conceivably, the number 
of European parties receiving financial support from Moscow is large enough to 
warrant the emergence of a wide pro-Russian bloc in Europe.9 
Populism and Russian Information Warfare
Russia seems capable of juggling with very different political parties from the 
radical left to the neo-conservative right. This capability is wired in Russia’s 
information warfare, a relatively new concept that still comes with several tags, 
such as cyber war or ‘weaponised disinformation.’10  Information warfare is designed 
to manipulate or confuse public opinion with intentionally false material, which is 
spread through the use of social media (including trolling) and a network of state-
sponsored media outlets.11  When the Russian information warfare became a key 
element of its operations during the Ukraine crisis the West took notice;12  since 
then, the transatlantic community has increasingly realised that Russia might be 
using information warfare in order to support populist parties.13
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Russia’s information warfare is attractive for both left and right wing 
populists because the Kremlin frames its foreign policy decisions with an anti-
establishment rhetoric based on false or even fabricated news.14 In this way, 
Russian foreign policy is not bound by a neo-conservative or any other ideological 
agenda, and therefore Putin’s interest in the European far right is not based only 
on coinciding political affinity.15  Quite the contrary, the Kremlin is adopting a 
nihilistic geopolitical approach.16  Since the ideological divides are not as clear-
cut now as they were during the Cold War, Russian propaganda can charm a 
wide and disparate assortment of political forces.17  The Russian ambition is that 
populist pressure will erode the Western liberal narrative in front-line states of 
the European periphery.18
The success of populist parties in the 2014 elections 
for the European Parliament suggests that pro-Russian 
narratives are working their way into the institutional 
corridors of the EU. This policy brief will attempt to 
identify these narratives expressed by MEPs from 
the European National Front (ENF), European United 
Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL) and Europe of 
Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) groups inside 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET). Their general 
voting behaviour has been studied elsewhere.1  Here, 
this general pattern will be re-examined with additional 
emphasis on specific narratives delivered during the 
procedure of tabling amendments to a number of 
Russia-related parliamentary reports voted in AFET. 
The analysis of these parliamentary amendments 
provides additional evidence to substantiate the claim 
that European populism demonstrates a remarkably 
coherent pro-Russian stance, which includes positions 
propagated by Russian information warfare.
Pro-Russian Narratives in the Committee on Foreign Affairs
With regard to the Ukraine crisis a key element of pro-Russian narratives is 
to describe the annexation of Crimea as ‘incorporation,’ ‘attachment’ or even 
‘reunification’ with Russia. This has been suggested by a bulk of almost identical 
amendments to the draft report ‘on the strategic military situation in the Black 
Sea Basin’ proposed by ENF’s Jean-Luc Schaffhauser (FN) and GUE’s Pablo 
Iglesias and Javier Couso Permuy (Podemos).19 The latter two recognised the 
Crimean referendum as legitimate referring to the right of self-determination as 
a lawful motive for the secession, and proposed another two amendments while 
reminding the Committee of NATO’s ‘war in favour of Kosovo’s secession from 
Serbia in 2008.’20  The draft report on ‘EU-Russia Relations’ received amendments 
deleting any reference to the Crimean annexation from Georg Mayer, Harald 
Vlimsky (Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and others from the ENF, as well as from 
the non-attached Giorgos Epitideios (Golden Dawn).21
Another key element of pro-Russian narratives is to accuse NATO, the EU and the 
Ukrainian government of unjustifiably provoking Russian aggression in Ukraine. 
Roughly the same group of the aforementioned MEPs proposed amendments 
that cited actions of NATO or general ‘American provocation’22  as the cause 
of the military escalation. A specific reference was made to the ‘Sea Breeze 
maneuver’23  in the Black Sea and NATO’s ‘Immediate Action Plan.’24 GUE’s 
Iglesias and Permuy termed NATO’s enlargement with Eastern European states 
as an ‘expansion’ made without ‘close consultation with Russia.’25  In the same 
AFET Committee report GUE’s Helmut Scholz accused the EU of attempting a 
coup in Russia, while fellow GUE Members Iglesias and Permuy also charged the 
EU with the ‘overthrow’ of the ‘democratically elected Ukrainian government.’26 
In addition, AFET Members coming from ENF, EFDD and GUE blamed the 
Ukrainian government for violating human rights and freedom of expression; for 
being a ‘threat to the stability of the region;’27  for having links to nationalists, 
extremists, and even fascists and neo-Nazis or paramilitary groups that have 
committed massacres and war crimes.28  In another AFET report an ensemble 
of ENF Members proposed an amendment quoting a widely circulated piece 
of disinformation attributing the destruction of flight MH17 to the Ukrainian 
government.29
Overall, inside the AFET Committee members coming from ENF and GUE in 
particular, repeated the populist themes concerning Russia and the US. These 
political groups supported Russia as a strategic and valuable trade partner 
(at least as valuable as the US) that shares common interests with the EU.30 
As a major supplier of energy, Russia is supposed to contribute to EU energy 
security.31  Therefore, EU-Russia relations should be improved and rivalry should 
be avoided.32  What is more, the European Neighbourhood policy should even 
anticipate a ‘convergence’ between ‘EU and Eurasian integration.’33  In almost 
every relevant AFET report the same group of MEPs did not neglect to refer to 
EU sanctions on Russia (following the Crimean annexation) as an ‘unnecessary,’ 
‘unfair’ and ‘ineffective’ measure that was employed to the detriment of the 
Russian people and the interests of the EU.34  Repeatedly, the same group of 
MEPs asked the EU to lift or discontinue the sanctions.35
The contrast regarding the US was stark: some ENF Members deplored US 
hegemonic power, which resulted in the ‘geopolitical subordination’ of the EU, 
the ‘subjection of the peoples of Europe.’ the threat of a ‘world government’ and 
the abandonment of the Eurasian project.36  Supposedly, it was the continuing 
‘American and Atlanticist propaganda’ that damaged EU-Russian relations.37  The 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was slated as a ‘strategic 
error’ that should be suspended, as it threatened to ‘destroy national sovereignty.’ 
Likewise for GUE, the TTIP was also a mistake that will result in loss of national 
sovereignty38 and favour the interests of transnational corporations;39  elsewhere 
GUE’s Iglesias and Permuy regretted Europe’s ‘dependence’ on American policies 
and ‘Euro-Atlantic elites.’40
Not Breaching, but…
The examination of populist themes and language used inside the AFET 
Committee of the European Parliament reveals yet another aspect of the already 
established connection that far left and far right groups have with Putin’s Russia. 
It also demonstrates a remarkable coherence of pro-Russian attitudes across 
the populist spectrum. However, despite the spectacular rise of the European 
populist parties in recent years, their electoral percentage is still inconsequential 
for the decision-making process and the legislative procedure in the European 
Parliament – simply put, all the aforementioned amendments were ultimately 
rejected by the AFET Committee. This conclusion suggests that representative 
democracy is particularly resilient in information warfare and that populist, pro-
Russian narratives still have a long way to go before breaching the European 
Parliament. But, this is not a reason to be complacent about the EU response to 
Russian information warfare.
The European reaction to mounting populist pressure from the left or the right 
also includes a tendency to resort to alternative, direct formats of democracy 
such as the referendum. The ambiguous referendum in Greece last summer, the 
more recent one in the Netherlands on the EU-Ukraine Association agreement, 
and the forthcoming UK referendum on EU Membership signal the emergence 
of a pattern that may be extended with referendums on forthcoming proposals 
for any EU treaty change or conceivably for lesser matters such as the TTIP. And 
referendum campaigns, in deep contrast to rigorous parliamentary procedures, 
can be especially vulnerable to information warfare.
A possible response to such vulnerability is to acknowledge that Russian 
information warfare is far more sophisticated than a few trolling farms and 
some viral hoaxes. It is based on an anti-western worldview that existed prior 
to the current regime (and will most likely outlive it). And the Kremlin does 
seem keen on returning to a historical pattern of geopolitical confrontation 
with the West.41  Hence, Russian narratives are making full use of the historical 
memory of their audiences42  and as a result, the implementation of Moscow’s 
strategy is segmented and region-specific.43  In other words, the Kremlin chooses 
to highlight different narratives depending on the audience: from the Russian 
Empire to the incompatibility of the Orthodox faith with Western Modernity, 
and from the Soviet win against Nazism to the role of the liberal world order in 
the collapse of communism. This kind of segmentation, specificity and historical 
approach should also become an essential element of a comprehensive Western 
strategy – one that will expose the contingency of the Russian narratives, while 
at the same time appreciate national historical memories and the diverse paths 
of Europeans to liberalism, to modernity and to the West itself.
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